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Formula Unjust: What Formula One Can
Learn from the American Justice System to
Improve Stewarding
BY APRATIM VIDYARTHI*
ABSTRACT
Formula One (F1), the highest form of motorsport, is one of the fastestgrowing sports in the United States, attracting millions of viewers and
billions of dollars in investment and prize money. But recent events in F1
have raised questions about the fairness of the sport. This Article contends
that the current system of officiating creates unfair outcomes, because
officials have overwhelming discretion to make pivotal decisions that
significantly impact the outcome of races, and because penalties are applied
inconsistently and cannot be appealed. Given the increased
professionalization of F1 and the high financial stakes involved, these
problems need to be remedied. This Article takes cues from the U.S. justice
system to propose three solutions: limits to the executive discretion of
Officials, a standardization of penalties, and a formalized appellate system
for penalties.

* J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School 2022. This piece would not have been possible
without Professor Mitchell Berman’s guidance and his enthusiastic and brilliant teaching of Jurisprudence
of Sport at Penn Law. Special thanks also to my mother, who spurred my interest in cars, and to Sir Lewis
Hamilton, who should have won the 2021 World Driver’s Championship. Finally, thanks to the staff of
the Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, who made this piece stronger than a F1
car’s monocoque. All views and errors in this piece are my own and not that of my employer.
[1]
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I. INTRODUCTION
On their face, the justice system and Formula One (F1) are poles apart.
In F1, pivotal decisions are made in fractions of seconds; in the justice
system, decisions are measured and take months, if not years. In F1, teams
compete for glory; in the justice system, parties compete for liberty and truth.
And in F1, stewards referee races without time to rely on precedent or debate
justice; in the justice system, judges and juries are measured, deliberative,
and thoughtful. But both systems have similarities, too: in both, billions of
dollars are on the line, the safety of participants is at stake, and most
importantly, both deal with essential questions of fairness.1 Recent events in
F1 have raised questions about the fairness of the sport. This Article argues
that the current system of stewarding2 leads to unfair outcomes. It also
creates an uneven playing field because race officials have overwhelming
discretion to make critical decisions that are consequential to the outcome of
the race, and because they apply penalties inconsistently, without the
possibility of appeal.
The issue of fairness has never been more pertinent than in the 2021 F1
World Championship (“2021 Championship”). For only the second time in
seventy-four seasons, the two championship contenders—defending
Champion and arguably the greatest of all time, Lewis Hamilton (driving for
Mercedes), and young upstart Max Verstappen (driving for Red Bull
Racing)—entered the final race equal on points, with the race becoming
winner-take-all.3 Until that point, the season had already seen plenty of
controversy: three major crashes between the title contenders,4
disqualifications against Mercedes and Hamilton,5 rule changes,6

1. Both systems also have great reality show counterparts: the justice system has Judge Judy
whereas F1 has Netflix’s Drive to Survive. See generally Judge Judy (Big Ticket Television 2021); Drive
to Survive (Box to Box Films 2019).
2. F1 stewards are the equivalent to referees in any other sport. They enforce rules and make
decisions
about
penalties,
amongst
other
things.
See
F1
Glossary,
F1,
https://www.formula1.com/en/championship/inside-f1/glossary.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
3. Andrew Benson, Lewis Hamilton Wins Thrilling Saudi Arabian Grand Prix After Max
Verstappen Collision, BBC SPORT (Dec. 5, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/sport/formula1/59542213.
4. See, e.g., Nate Saunders, Max Verstappen, Lewis Hamilton Can Have Points Deducted for
‘Unsportsmanlike’ Crash, ESPN (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/32828344/maxverstappen-lewis-hamilton-points-deducted-unsportsmanlike-crash (discussing the history of crashes
between Hamilton and Verstappen within the season and officials’ warnings to the rivals that a deliberate
crash in the season finale would lead to penalties).
5. Nate Saunders, Lewis Hamilton Disqualified from Sao Paulo GP Qualifying for Illegal Rear
Wing, ESPN (Nov. 13, 2021), https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/32620084/lewis-hamiltondisqualified-sao-paulo-gp-qualifying-illegal-rear-wing.
6. See, e.g., Andrew Benson, Formula 1: Red Bull’s Christian Horner Says Pit Stop Rule Change
‘Disappointing’, BBC SPORT (June 25, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/sport/formula1/57615628
(discussing F1’s rule change that slowed pit stops to increase the safety of mechanics).
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inconsistent in-race stewarding decisions,7 and myriad challenges to the
stewards’ decisions,8 creating a tense and frosty relationship between the
rivals.9
Going into the final race of the Championship at Abu Dhabi, Hamilton
took the lead and maintained it for the first fifty-seven laps.10 On the fiftythird lap, a crash caused the race stewards to wave yellow flags, requiring all
cars to slow down and follow a safety car without overtaking until the
stewards deemed it safe to resume racing.11 The safety car operates to
effectively bunch all cars in order, thus removing any time gaps or
advantages gained during normal racing. Safety cars also enable “cheap” pit
stops. Because cars are no longer racing, drivers can come into the pits for a
fresh set of tires without worrying that their opponents are pressing an
advantage or building a lead. But overtaking is not permitted during safety
laps—meaning if the driver in the lead pits and comes out in second place,
they have lost a position, since they cannot overtake the frontrunner to regain
the lead. However, although overtaking to regain grid position is not allowed,
the rules also require that for a safety lap to end and for normal racing to
resume, all lapped cars12 must be allowed to “unlap” themselves such that
the order of the cars on track reflects the position of the cars in the race.13
7. Phillip Horton, F1 Driver Discontent Over Slow, Inconsistent Rulings Clouds Otherwise
Sensational Season, AUTOWEEK (Nov. 27, 2021), https://www.autoweek.com/racing/formula1/a38365713/f1-driver-discontent-inconsistent-rulings/.
8. See, e.g., Laurence Edmondson, Max Verstappen: F1 Stewards Treat Me Unfairly, ESPN (Dec.
9, 2021), https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/32828829/max-verstappen-f1-stewards-treat-unfairly
(discussing Verstappen’s complaints that he had been unfairly penalized and that stewards’ rulings were
inconsistent).
9. See, e.g., Haydn Cobb, Verstappen Slams Hamilton for “Disrespectful” F1 Win Celebrations,
MOTORSPORT (July 18, 2021, 11:07 AM), https://www.motorsport.com/f1/news/verstappen-hamiltonunsportsmanlike-celebrations-silverstone/6633307/ (describing the relationship between Verstappen and
Hamilton during the middle of the season).
10. See generally 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix, FANDOM: FORMULA 1 WIKI,
https://f1.fandom.com/wiki/2021_Abu_Dhabi_Grand_Prix (last visited Jan. 4, 2022) (describing the
events in the race).
11. Id.
12. For example: Cosmo, Elaine, George, and Jerry are in a race. Cosmo is in first place (denoted as
P1), and Jerry is in second (P2). Cosmo has done an entire lap more than George has, passing George
(third position, P3) after completing that extra lap. Thus, Cosmo is ahead of George by more than one
lap. Jerry is in second, following Cosmo, but he hasn’t overtaken George a second time. Thus, on track,
Cosmo is first, George follows, and Jerry is following George. But in the race, Cosmo is P1 (having
lapped George), Jerry is P2 (not having lapped George), and George is P3 (and is getting upset). Elaine
is eating a Big Salad in P4.
13. FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L’AUTOMOBILE, 2021 FORMULA ONE SPORTING
REGULATIONS
art.
48.12,
at
50
(Dec.
8,
2021),
https://www.fia.com/sites/default/files/2021_formula_1_sporting_regulations_-_iss_13_-_2021-1208.pdf [hereinafter 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS]. Note that this Article uses the 2021 regulations
rather than the 2022 regulations because most of the penalty rules are unchanged, and because the 2021
regulations are more directly applicable to the events of the 2021 season.
In the Cosmo, Elaine, George, and Jerry example, assume Cosmo is P1, Jerry is P2, George is P3,
and Elaine is P4. But the track position is Cosmo, George, Elaine, and then Jerry. Rule 48.12 would
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In the race, Hamilton had no choice but to remain on track and not
change his well-worn and slower tires. Entering the pits to replace his tires
may have meant that he reentered the track behind Verstappen, costing him
first place and thus the championship.14 On the other hand, because the race
was winner-take-all, Verstappen chose to pit since he was in second place
with nothing to lose. Coming out on fresher, faster tires, Verstappen
reentered the race in second place, but with three lapped cars in between
himself and Hamilton, while the safety car was still on track. Mercedes’
reading of the rules was that, with fewer than three laps remaining, it would
take the remaining duration of the race for all lapped cars to unlap
themselves, rejoin at the back of the pack, and permit normal racing to
resume. Thus, a textual reading of the rules combined with precedent
indicated that the race would end behind the safety car. But the Race Director
controversially used his permitted discretion—in contrast to precedent and
the explicit rules15—to resume racing before all lapped cars unlapped
themselves, allowing only the cars standing between Hamilton and
Verstappen to unlap themselves and move ahead of Hamilton.16 This halfmeasure permitted Verstappen to race Hamilton in a dramatic and
manufactured last-lap shootout on lap fifty-eight. With fresh tires,
Verstappen easily overtook Hamilton for the victory, winning his first
championship in the final half of the final lap of the final race.17
require George and Elaine to overtake Cosmo (and thus unlap themselves), complete an entire lap, and
arrive behind Jerry. The track position would then match the race position: Cosmo (P1), Jerry (P2),
George (P3), and Elaine (P4).
14. For a detailed explanation of this incident, see generally 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix, supra note
10.
15. See infra note 77 and accompanying discussion.
16. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 15.3, at 12.
17. Mercedes protested the race results after the checkered flag, arguing that Articles 48.12
(requiring that lapped cars unlap themselves) and 48.8 (protocols for safety cars returning to the pits) had
been breached, and asking for the order of the drivers at the time of the safety car to be the final
classification of the race. Stewards Dismiss Mercedes’ Abu Dhabi Grand Prix Protests, As Team Lodge
Intention to Appeal, F1 (Dec. 12, 2021), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.breaking-stewardsdismiss-mercedes-abu-dhabi-grand-prix-protests-as-team.Q8StGwXFdORYlI32Jggoz.html.
The stewards dismissed this challenge, noting that “Article 15.3 allows the Race Director to
control the use of the safety car, which in our determination includes its deployment and withdrawal. . .
although Article 48.12 may not have been applied fully. . . .” THE STEWARDS, DECISION - MERCEDES
PROTEST ART. 48.12 (Dec. 12, 2021, 11:03 PM), https://www.fia.com/sites/default/files/decisiondocument/2021%20Abu%20Dhabi%20Grand%20Prix%20-%20Decision%20%20Mercedes%20Protest%20Art.%2048.12.pdf (emphasis added). The stewards also dismissed the
Article 48.8 challenge. THE STEWARDS, DECISION - MERCEDES PROTEST ART. 48.8, (Dec. 12, 2021,
10:15
PM),
https://www.fia.com/sites/default/files/decisiondocument/2021%20Abu%20Dhabi%20Grand%20Prix%20-%20Decision%20%20Mercedes%20Protest%20Art.%2048.8.pdf. Mercedes decided not to appeal the decisions, finding
that a dialogue with the FIA to improve race protocols was better for the integrity of the sport. Nate
Saunders, Mercedes Will Not Appeal Abu Dhabi Grand Prix Result, ESPN (Dec. 16, 2021),
https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/32880621/mercedes-not-appeal-abu-dhabi-grand-prix-result.
This author’s understanding is that the Race Director’s decision was improper because it did not
follow precedent in prior races. The underlying excellence measured in F1 is the speed of the drivers and
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This Article does not dissect this final race, the countless what-ifs, and
the resulting distress for fans of either driver. Rather, given the growing
popularity of F1 in the U.S. and globally, this Article assesses how F1’s
stewardship system can take cues from the U.S. justice system to achieve
fairer outcomes.18 Part I of this Article provides a pit-stop like brief overview
of F1 and its stewardship system.19 Part II describes three major problems
arising from stewarding: the overwhelming discretion awarded to the Race
Director; a lack of consistency in officiating; and the lack of instant replay.
Part III looks to the justice system to see how to improve stewarding, arguing
for a limit to the executive discretion of the Race Director, a standardization
of penalties, and a formalized and expanded in-race penalty appeals system.

II. FORMULA WHAT?
F1 is an international open-wheel single-seater racing league. Put
simply, the cars have one unroofed seat—the driver’s—and the wheels are
uncovered, making the cars lighter and faster than almost all other road
vehicles.20 It is the highest class of racing permitted by the Fédération
Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), the world’s motorsport governing
body. Widely considered the pinnacle of motorsport,21 F1 races feature
wheel-to-wheel racing at speeds of more than 200 miles per hour,22 with

the technical and strategic excellence of the teams. Mercedes correctly predicted that precedent would be
followed and thus strategized around it, whereas Red Bull gambled in the hopes that precedent would not
be followed. The decision awarded the gamble, but only because it was unexpected and allowed the Race
Director to override the stated rules and prior precedent.
18. Of course, comparisons to other legal systems may be more appropriate. But because of the
dearth of literature around F1 and the jurisprudence of sports, in addition to this author’s familiarity with
the U.S. legal system (as a lawyer, not as a defendant—yet), this Article focuses on a comparison to the
American justice system. Future work could expand to the birthplaces of F1, England and France. See
generally The History of F1 Racing, MONTREAL GRAND PRIX (Apr. 15, 2018),
https://montrealgrandprix.com/news/the-history-of-f1-racing/.
19. For a longer explanation, I’d have to ask you how much time you have.
20. The current minimum weight of an F1 car is 798 kilograms (1,756 pounds). Lucy Rimmer, How
Much Does an F1 Car Weigh in 2022 and What’s Included in the Limit, AUTOSPORT (Apr. 27, 2022,
11:02 PM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/how-much-does-an-f1-car-weigh/10246442/. Aside
from a Smart car, most cars weigh above 2,600 pounds, with the average road car weighing almost 4,200
pounds. See, e.g., Lizzie Nealon, Average Car Weight, BANKRATE (Oct. 20, 2021),
https://www.bankrate.com/insurance/car/average-car-weight/; Top Gear, Supercar vs. Motorbike vs. F1
Car:
Top
Gear
Festival
Sydney,
YOUTUBE
(Sept.
7,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ygT4bGJkerk (noting that even in comparison to other racing cars
that are lighter and more powerful than road cars, F1 cars simply outdo them).
21. See, e.g., Top Gear UK: Series 10, Episode 7 (BBC UK broadcast Nov. 25, 2007) (featuring
presenter Richard Hammond driving the 2005 championship-winning Renault F1 car and facing the
physical difficulties of dealing with the complexities, speed, and acceleration of an F1 car); see Top Gear,
Richard
Drives
a
F1
Car
Round
Silverstone,
YOUTUBE
(Nov.
7,
2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EGUZJVY-sHo for a publicly available clip.
22. Anna Duxbury & Joe Holding, How Fast Is an F1 Car? Top Speeds of F1, Indycar, MotoGP
and More, AUTOSPORT (May 30, 2022, 12:00 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/how-fast-is-anf1-car-top-speeds-of-f1-indycar-motogp-and-more-4980734/4980734/.
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drivers facing more than 5 Gs of force while driving.23 Inevitably, this
requires incredible groundbreaking rocket science-levels of engineering
from teams24 and immense fighter jet pilot-levels of physical skill and
training from drivers.25 The high speed, wheel-to-wheel racing, and extreme
precision required can lead to high-speed collisions,26 running the risk of
significant injury or death on track.27
Each year, F1 hosts a championship consisting of more than twenty
races in a variety of locations across five continents. Races are either on
racetracks or on street courses with the roads modified to satisfy safety
guidelines. Each participating team, led by a team principle,28 fields two
drivers in two separate cars on a given race weekend.29 Race weekends,
hosted from Friday through Sunday, consist of (1) up to three practice
sessions wherein teams and drivers test their cars, setups, strategies, and
knowledge of the track; (2) a qualifying session where drivers attempt to set
the fastest lap, which helps determine the order of the starting grid; and (3)
the race, which grants points towards winning the championship.30 The
higher the finishing position, the more points that are awarded.31 Currently,
23. Video: Analysing 2017’s Massive Rises in G-Force, F1 (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.video-analysing-2017s-massive-rises-in-gforce.vX8IhGjqmsaCoyy2uKKOi.html.
24. See generally ADRIAN NEWEY, HOW TO BUILD A CAR (2017) (describing the advanced
aerodynamics and engineering required to engineer a modern F1 car). The advanced engineering of F1
cars tests the bounds of physics, chemistry, materials science, engineering, with the complexity of the
cars rivaling fighter jets and spacecraft. Sebastian Anthony, Formula 1: A Technical Deep Dive into
Building the World’s Fastest Cars, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 4, 2017, 5:26 AM),
https://arstechnica.com/cars/2017/04/formula-1-technology/.
25. Joe Holding, F1 Driver Training: What’s Their Workout Regime, Diet, Cardio & More,
MOTORSPORT (Mar. 22, 2021, 5:29 AM), https://us.motorsport.com/f1/news/f1-driver-training-workoutregime-diet-cardio/5847576/.
26. See, e.g., Laurence Edmondson, The Collisions That Defined Some of F1’s Iconic Rivalries,
ESPN (July 21, 2021), https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/31855567/the-track-collisions-defined-somef1-iconic-rivalries (listing consequential crashes in F1 history).
27. See, e.g., Grosjean Posts Image of Injured Hands After Having Dressings Removed for the Final
Time, F1 (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.romain-grosjean-reveals-he-nolonger-needs-dressings-on-hands-injured-in.hpSn89NMOMeM8evFbLQMu.html (discussing former F1
driver Romain Grosjean’s burns on his hands after a fiery crash in the 2020 Bahrain Grand Prix). But
incidents go beyond causing injuries, and no driver is exempt from death—including former champions.
The most recent death occurred from an on-track incident in 2014. See generally List of Formula One
fatalities, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Formula_One_fatalities (last visited Mar.
28, 2022).
28. The team principle is the equivalent of a coach in the National Basketball Association (NBA) or
in other team sports, and is responsible for managing the drivers, the staff, and critical big-picture
decisions. Richard Asher, F1 Team Principals: Who Are They and What Do They Do, MOTORSPORT
(Aug. 9, 2022, 12:16 PM), https://us.motorsport.com/f1/news/f1-team-principals-who-are-they-andwhat-do-they-do/10351168/.
29. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art 6.2, at 4.
30. See, e.g., id. art. 6.4, at 4 (describing the points system); id. arts. 31-38, at 32-43 (describing the
race weekend); F1 Schedule 2022, F1, https://www.formula1.com/en/racing/2022.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2022) (providing an example of the race calendar and race weekend).
31. Id. art. 6.4, at 4-5.
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there are ten teams fielding two cars each,32 with the first ten finishing
positions awarded points at the completion of each race.33
At the end of the season, the team with the most points combined
between both drivers across all races wins the World Constructor’s
Championship. Similarly, the individual driver with the most points across
all races in the season wins the World Driver’s Championship.34 The total
prize money for winning the Constructor’s Championship varies, but is
generally more than $20 million. In addition to the Constructor’s
Championship, a total of more than $900 million is distributed across the
teams on the grid each year based on the total number of points won by the
team at the end of the year, meaning that every point won makes a huge
financial difference.35 Of course, given the global nature of F1 and its
reputation as the pinnacle of motorsport, drivers compete for more than prize
money: they race for the coveted title of World Driver’s Champion and the
acclaim, glory, and greatness that follows.
Both championships are governed by individuals from the FIA.
Additionally, individual races are officiated (more commonly known as
stewarding) by the FIA and the National Sporting Authority (ASN) affiliated
with the country where the race is hosted.36 Each individual race is officiated
by one Race Director, one permanent starter, four stewards (three of which
are appointed by the FIA and one by the ASN), and a clerk appointed by the
ASN.37 The duties and level of authority differ drastically between the
different roles. For example, the Race Director retains overriding authority
in key constitutive rules,38 such as controlling and stoppage of the race,
stopping any cars that violate the sporting code, managing the starting
procedure, and directing the use of the safety car.39 In contrast, stewards
make decisions about regulative rules, such as determining which penalties
apply when rules are infringed, and overruling judges of fact.40 Thus,
stewards are akin to the on-the-ground officiators or referees in the National

32. F1 Teams 2022, F1, https://www.formula1.com/en/teams.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2022).
33. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 6.4, at 4-5.
34. Id. art. 6.1, at 4.
35. Sroban Ghosh, Formula 1 Prize Money 2022, SILLYSEASON (Sept. 5, 2022),
https://sillyseason.com/money/formula-1-prize-money-118349/.
36. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, at 1.
37. Id. arts. 15.1–.2, at 12.
38. A constitutive rule does “not merely regulate [but] create[s] or define[s] new forms of behavior,”
whereas a regulative rule “regulate[s] antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior.” JOHN
R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 33 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1969). For a deeper discussion, see MITCHELL N. BERMAN & RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF SPORT 111-12 (2021).
39. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 15.3, at 12.
40. Id. art. 15.7, at 12, art. 18.1, at 13.
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Basketball Association (NBA),41 whereas the Race Director plays a bigpicture role like the League Office in the NBA.42 Together, these officials
(collectively, the “Officials”) oversee an entire race weekend.
Pertinent to the controversy at the end of the 2021 Championship,
Officials’ responsibilities include when to call a safety car,43 whether to
apply penalties to drivers on track or after the end of a race,44 and whether to
overrule judges of fact.45 Concretely, stewards can decide to issue penalties
to drivers who breach track limits (going beyond the borders of the track),
illegally overtake (for example, by going beyond the borders of the track),
cause collisions, fail to slow down for yellow flags (which mandate slowing
down), or who otherwise do not follow the rules.46 Stewards can also issue
penalties when cars do not satisfy the technical regulations, such as having
enough fuel or weighing less than the minimum required weight for a car.47
Taken together, this gives Officials a wide berth of discretion to determine
what constitutes behavior that must be penalized, when and what penalties
are applied, and how to manage the conduct of the race. This discretion is in
direct contrast with the otherwise precision-oriented nature of the sport and
raises questions of fairness that were exacerbated by how the 2021
Championship ended.

III. STEWARDING IS A BLACK BOX
The ethos of F1 is to push the boundaries: cars push the boundaries of
physics and driver physicality; engineers push the boundaries of the
technical regulations; and drivers push the boundaries of the rules. This
means that races are fast-paced, with incidents and overtakes happening in
milliseconds. Officials are thus expected to make quick decisions about
whether drivers receive penalties for pushing the rules and must do so after
looking at reams of data, both visual and technical.48 This pace of decision
41. See generally NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, 2019-20 OFFICIAL RULES r. 2, at 10-14,
https://ia801906.us.archive.org/24/items/nbarules201920/2019-2020-NBA-Rule-Book.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2022) [hereinafter 2019-20 NBA RULEBOOK].
42. Though the League Office’s portfolio of rules is not completely defined in the rulebook, the
League Office handles problems with officials; tracks fines and unsportsmanlike conduct; reviews
players’ rule infringements; and decides postponement or cancellation of a game. See generally id.; see
also id. r. 12, at 38-48, r. 3, at 15-17, Comments on the Rules, § II(D), at 64.
43. See generally 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 48, at 49-51.
44. See generally id. art. 47, at 47-48.
45. Id. art. 15.7, at 12.
46. Id. art. 27, at 29.
47. Id. art. 29.2, at 32.
48. For example, Officials often look at video footage and telemetry data from the cars indicating
whether the driver was braking or accelerating in order to determine whether one driver drove another
off the track. See, e.g., Dieter Rencken & Keith Collantine, Stewards Made Verstappen Call Without His
Forward-Facing Video of Hamilton Incident, RACEFANS (Nov. 14, 2021, 10:37 PM),
https://www.racefans.net/2021/11/14/stewards-made-verstappen-call-without-his-forward-facingcamera-video-of-hamilton-incident/ (discussing the Officials’ lack of use of all video data when failing
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making, combined with the inflow of telemetry data and visual evidence,
means Officials are likely to make mistakes that might determine the
outcome of a race or championship. First, the potential for the biggest
mistakes comes from the Race Director’s strong discretion with respect to
approving or imposing penalties49 and regulating the race (e.g., when the
safety car re-enters the pits).50 Second, the underlying rationale and
applicable standards for decisions made by the Race Director and stewards
are unpublished and inaccessible, creating difficulty in interpreting the rules
and creating consistent precedent. And finally, most such penalties cannot
be appealed.51 Taken together, these strictures permit unfixable mistakes and
create in impenetrable black box that creates confusion and inconsistency
around officiating, which undermines the underlying test of human
excellence at the heart of the sport, and questions whether outcomes are fair
to participants and fans.
A. RACE DIRECTOR’S OVERWHELMING DISCRETION
Officials can have “weak” or “strong” discretion.52 Weak discretion
exists where officials use their evaluative judgment to apply a standard,53
like when stewards make penalty decisions.54 This discretion is governed by
the standards set forth in the Sporting Regulations, placing some limits on
the level of discretion. In contrast, strong discretion is where Officials are
not bound by any standards set by the rules.55 The Race Director is afforded
two forms of strong discretion: discretion to make decisions within the
boundaries of rules; and discretion not to apply or follow the rules entirely.
The first category of strong discretion is less worrisome because the rules
themselves are boundaries, even though the rules lack standards. Decisions
in this category include permitting the use of the Drag Reduction System
(DRS)56 in changing weather conditions,57 requiring medical examinations
of drivers,58 and requiring a driver to give back a position if the Race Director

to make a penalty determination); Jack Benyon, The Data That Cleared Up a Confounding F1 Title Rival
Clash, THE RACE (Dec. 26, 2021), https://the-race.com/formula-1/video-what-verstappen-and-hamiltondata-reveals-about-saudi-arabian-grand-prix-collision/ (analyzing a penalized crash using telemetry).
49. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 27.3, at 29.
50. Id. art. 51.10(a), at 54.
51. Id. art. 47.3, at 47-48.
52. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-33 (Harv. Univ. Press 1977).
53. Id. at 32-33.
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 32.
56. DRS increases a car’s speed and facilitates overtaking. It can only be used if a driver is within
one second of another car. Joe Miles, Winning Formula: What Is DRS, What Does It Stand for, and When
Did F1 Introduce It? All You Need to Know About Drag Reduction System, SUN (Aug. 25, 2022, 10:56
AM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/sport/6704754/f1-drs-drag-reduction-system-explained-verstappen/.
57. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 21.5, at 16-17.
58. Id. art. 22.15, at 21.
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deems the infringing driver left the track unreasonably.59 The second
category of strong discretion is more problematic because the decision not
to apply the rules can create unfairness or the perception of unfairness.
Decisions in this category include determining when the safety car enters the
pits (such as in the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix, supra),60 permitting
exceptions to the general safety provisions,61 and referring on-track incidents
to the stewards to determine whether penalties should be applied.62
This strong discretion is problematic for many reasons, but three are
important in the context of recent events. First, given that communications
between team principals and the Race Director were broadcast to the public,
when the Race Director uses their strong discretion—and is swayed by an
argument from one team principal over another—it perpetuates an image of
unfairness that calls into question the integrity of the sport. As of the 2022
season, the FIA no longer permits the broadcast of such communications
publicly, but team principals are still permitted to communicate with the
Race Director in the background, which ultimately raises the same issue.63
Second, the events of lap fifty-eight of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix
demonstrate that the Race Director’s discretion to override safety car rules
interferes with the underlying contest between drivers. This gives the Race
Director determinative input into the outcome of the race without guardrails.
Finally, such strong discretion without guidelines creates problems for
appeals,64 since there is no standard by which to judge whether discretion
was abused. Taken together, this harms the underlying test of the contest, the
drivers’ just deserts, and the image of fairness to fans.
B. LACK OF CONSISTENCY IN STEWARDING
The rules governing driver conduct on-track, and team conduct offtrack, are more standard-like than rule-like.65 For example, drivers are
expected to “make every reasonable effort to use the track at all times and
may not leave the track without a justifiable reason.”66 Stewards are
responsible for first judging whether an off-track excursion is justifiable, and
the Race Director may then direct a driver to return any advantage gained by

59. Id. art. 27.3, at 29.
60. Id. art. 15.3(e), at 12.
61. See, e.g., id. art. 22.12, at 20.
62. Id. art. 47.1, at 47.
63. Luis Vasconcelos, New Rules on F1 Radio Communication, AUTOACTION (Feb. 18, 2022),
https://autoaction.com.au/2022/02/18/new-rules-on-f1-radio-communication.
64. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 17.3, at 13, art. 47.3, at 48. Broadly, Article
17.3 provides that appeals are permissible in some circumstances. Article 47.3 specifically notes that
disqualification from results and suspension from future events, unlike other penalties, are appealable.
65. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited,
79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (explaining the distinction between rules and standards).
66. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 27.3, at 29.
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leaving the track, for example by letting a competitor overtake them.67 This
standard-based rule means that Officials must inject some element of
subjectivity into their decisions for on-track penalties. Since neither the F1
Regulations nor the FIA International Sporting Code (the FIA Code) guide
what penalties apply to various infractions, such subjectivity is needed
because decisions about what penalty to issue are ultimately left to the
stewards’ discretion.68 However, this subjectivity inevitably leads to
inconsistency, which may create bias or unfairness in penalty decisions.
Combined with the inability to appeal penalties and the frequency with
which such racing incidents take place on track,69 such unfairness may have
consequential impacts that benefit one driver over another. And while
appeals may compound subjectivity by using vague standards, an iterative
appeals process that also tracks precedent would help provide clarity in the
face of such vagueness and may mitigate errors.
The inconsistency stemming from stewards’ subjectivity also boasts
practical consequences. Drivers are operating their cars at high speeds and
require clear guidelines regarding what is permissible on-track. For example,
if a driver doesn’t know whether their competitor will be permitted to push
them off-track, they may give less room to the competitor in a tight turn
because the driver thinks that they cannot “legally” be pushed off track,
causing a collision. Especially at high speeds, drivers need some element of
predictability—both for the safety of all drivers, and so that the drivers can
strategize fairly.70 Without consistent standards, drivers who play it safe by
not pushing other drivers off-track lose out, while drivers who “get their

67. Id. For a visual example, on lap one of the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix, Hamilton left the track, but
Officials decided that he was justified in doing so because Verstappen forced him off. Thus, the advantage
Hamilton gained from cutting the corner neutralized the advantage Verstappen gained from pushing
Hamilton off. See, e.g., Bethan Clargo, How Max Verstappen Won the Controversial Abu Dhabi Grand
Prix, ESPN (Dec. 12, 2021), https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/32851709/how-max-verstappen-woncontroversial-abu-dhabi-grand-prix.
68. See FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L’AUTOMOBILE, 2021 FIA INTERNATIONAL SPORTING
CODE, art 12.4.4, at 54 (2021), https://www.fia.com/regulation/category/123 [hereinafter 2021 FIA
CODE] (choose “International Sporting Code” under “Category View” dropdown menu; then choose
“2021 Int’l Sporting Code (FR-EN)”; then click downloaded PDF) (“Any one of the above penalties can
only be inflicted after consideration of the evidence available. . . .”).
69. Of course, many sports have unappealable penalties, such as soccer’s yellow and red cards. Such
penalties, however, are either infrequent (e.g., yellow/red cards in soccer), or have a small magnitude of
impact (e.g., team fouls in basketball after a team has exhausted its appeals). The frequency of on-track
incidents, combined with the significance of the impact—a lost position, a crash, or lost time—means
that an unfairly or inconsistently applied penalty is frequently going to be consequential to the outcome
of the race.
70. See, e.g., Keith Collantine, “Random” Rules Let F1’s American Fans Down Says Alonso After
Track Limits Row, RACEFANS (Oct. 24, 2021, 10:30 PM), https://www.racefans.net/2021/10/24/randomrules-let-f1s-american-fans-down-says-alonso-after-track-limits-row/ (noting the inconsistences at the
2021 U.S. Grand Prix, where two-time World Champion Fernando Alonso was penalized for a racing
move that his opponent was not penalized for, affecting Alonso’s race outcome).
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elbows out” and push others off track may not get a penalty—incentivizing
“safer” drivers to drive more aggressively, at the risk of a collision.
The effects of inconsistent decision-making are not limited to
individual drivers: teams are also impacted. Since tire strategy,71 pit stop
strategy,72 and other strategic decisions (e.g., whether to prepare for rain or
a red flag) are calculated with incredible precision and assessed by the pit
wall and race strategists,73 an inconsistent decision-making process
undermines the underlying accuracy that is a fundamental part of F1 racing.
In effect, the fuzziness of the standards applied by stewards through
inconsistent decision-making creates an uneven playing field contrary to the
basic excellences that F1 aims to display. The clearest example of this
uneven playing field is the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix. As noted, Mercedes
were not planning on pitting Hamilton’s car after the safety car came out on
lap fifty-three, because the rules indicated that it would take until the end of
the race for the track to be cleared and for the safety car to re-enter the pits.74
Thus, the team—under the expectation that the rules would be followed that
the safety car would permit all lapped cars to unlap themselves75—made a
strategic calculation to keep Hamilton in first place, operating under the
assumption that the track position would remain the same until the race
ended under the safety car.76 However, the safety car was pitted before all
lapped cars could unlap, giving an advantage to Verstappen and Red Bull,
who pitted their car in the hopes that the safety car would re-enter the pits
sooner. In effect, the decision to pit the safety car early hurt the team with
the more accurate and well-thought-out strategy. Consequently, the Race
Director’s decision—inconsistent with precedent made by the same Race

71. Tire strategy refers to deciding which tires to put on a car. In F1, teams choose from tires made
of soft rubber, which are faster but last for less time, requiring a pit stop sooner, or tires made of hard
rubber, which are slower but last longer. Different tire choices lead to different race paces and thus
different race outcomes. Insider’s Guide: What Are F1’s Tyre Rules?, MOTORSPORT (Feb. 28, 2022, 5:35
AM), https://us.motorsport.com/f1/news/insiders-guide-what-are-f1s-tyre-rules/6885459/.
72. Pit stop strategy refers to when a team decides to bring their cars in for a tire change. Teams are
required to pit their cars at least once. Teams choose when to pit their cars based on the condition of the
tires, the speed of competitors, changing weather conditions, and track position. Insider’s Guide: How
F1
Race
Strategy
Works,
MOTORSPORT
(Jan.
31,
2022,
10:52
AM),
https://us.motorsport.com/f1/news/how-f1-race-strategy-works/6791894/.
73. See, e.g., Beyond the Grid, Listen: The Secrets of Race Strategy with Alfa Romeo’s Ruth
Buscombe, F1 (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.listen-the-secrets-of-racestrategy-with-alfa-romeos-ruth-buscombe.4pIe3ek4nug1z08soNPnrH.html (describing the calculations
that race strategists make when determining different race variables).
74. See generally 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix, supra note 10 and accompanying discussion.
75. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 48.12, at 50.
76. Claire Cottingham, Lewis Hamilton Absent in Press Conference as Max Verstappen Reacts to
Mercedes Protest, EXPRESS (Dec. 13, 2021, 7:16 AM), https://www.express.co.uk/sport/f1autosport/1535098/Lewis-Hamilton-skips-press-conference-Max-Verstappen-reacts-Mercedes-protest.
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Director77—cost Hamilton and Mercedes the win, the championship, and a
small fortune in prize winnings.
The underlying cause of this inconsistency may be the sport’s failure to
keep records of past decisions, effectively making it impossible to determine
what is precedential. Although this may be difficult in sports where
thousands of games are played each season (each with tens, if not hundreds
of fouls and penalties), such as the NBA or Major League Baseball (MLB),
F1 only hosts around twenty races each year, and each race generates a small
handful of penalties, which can be easily tracked. Tracking such penalties
may mitigate unfair inconsistencies and may also hold Officials accountable
for makeup calls where Officials either adjust their epistemic or behavioral
standard when trying to correct for previously missed calls, thereby
compounding the determinative role of the Officials in the outcome of the
race.78
C. INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED PENALTIES AND THE LACK OF APPEALS
Article 17.3 of the 2021 F1 Sporting Regulations notes that “[a]ppeals
may not be made against decision[s]” regarding in-race time penalties,
penalties for infringements during practice sessions, penalties for
infringements during race starts and race resumptions, and drops of grid
positions due to overuse of spare parts, engines, and gearboxes.79 This
creates a variety of issues.
First, the definition of what constitutes a violation is vague. It is unclear
what standard Officials are applying when determining whether a penalty
should be issued. Both the F1 Sporting Regulations and FIA Code define the
guidelines for driving and penalties in a standard-like, subjective manner.80
For example, the FIA Code requires drivers to remain on track unless there
is “justifiable reason” to leave the track.81 Drivers cannot make maneuvers
“to hinder other drivers, such as deliberate crowding of a car beyond the edge

77. See, e.g., Henry Valantine, Masi Ruling Contradicts Previous Lapped Car Clarification,
PLANETF1 (Dec. 14, 2021, 11:45 PM), https://www.planetf1.com/news/michael-masi-contradictslapped-car-clarification/ (noting the 2020 Eifel Grand Prix Race Director Michael Masi’s statement,
“There’s a requirement in the sporting regulations to wave all the lapped cars past . . . . [This] directly
goes against what he opted to do in Abu Dhabi, whereby only the lapped runners positioned between
Hamilton and Verstappen on track were allowed to un-lap themselves.”).
78. See generally BERMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 387-91 (internal citations omitted) and
accompanying discussion.
79. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 17.3, at 13.
80. Id. art. 18.1, at 13; 2021 FIA CODE, supra note 68, art. 12, at 49-58; FÉDÉRATION
INTERNATIONALE DE L’AUTOMOBILE, APPENDIX L TO THE INTERNATIONAL SPORTING CODE, ch. IV, art.
2(b), at 47 (Dec. 15, 2021), https://www.fia.com/regulation/category/123 (choose “Appendix L
International Sporting Code” under the “Category View” dropdown menu; then choose “Appendix L International Drivers’ licenses, medical examinations, driver’s equipment and conduct – 2021”; then open
downloaded PDF) [hereinafter CODE APPENDIX L].
81. CODE APPENDIX L, supra note 80.
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of the track or any other abnormal change of direction.”82 Given the
subjective nature of “justifiable,” “deliberate,” and “abnormal,” these
provisions are not hardline rules, but are instead standards. Due to the
underlying subjectivity of implementing standards, two similar incidents
may be penalized in different ways. An appeals process would at least allow
consistency where similar incidents are initially penalized differently.
Further, permitting appeals allows new facts to be brought to Officials. This
is especially pertinent in F1, where immense amounts of data are being
generated each second, especially from car telemetry, but may not be seen,
sent to, or analyzed by the Officials immediately. Presenting Officials with
new data or facts may thus help create consistency by showing how an
incident that may have prima facie looked different to a prior incident is in
fact is similar to the prior incident.
Second, the problem is more than just an issue of definition and
subjectivity. Officials may determine whether to apply penalties to different
drivers based on where they stand in the rankings. For example, a penalty
applied to a championship contender (such as Hamilton or Verstappen in
2021) might determine the outcome of the championship, whereas a similar
penalty applied to two drivers outside the ten points scoring positions would
not.83 In theory, whether a penalty is applied depends on the ratio of the cost
of false positives to the cost of false negatives.84 But if Officials assess the
cost of false positives—a driver gets a penalty even though they did nothing
wrong—and of false negatives—a driver escapes a penalty even though they
violated the rules—based on the driver’s position, then the standard of proof
being applied varies from driver to driver. These variations arise because the
cost of a false positive or negative for a championship-contending driver may
be the championship, whereas the cost of a false positive or negative to
someone eliminated from contention may be meaningless. At its heart, this
is unfair: different competitors are subject to different rules based on where
they stand in the championship.
Under ideal circumstances, Officials impose a penalty only if the odds
that the penalty was committed has been ex ante judged to be greater than or
equal to the ratio of the cost of false positives to false negatives.85 This is like
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Adam Cooper, Why F1 Drivers Are Still Confused Over Racing Rules, AUTOSPORT
(Nov. 21, 2021, 1:04 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/why-f1-drivers-are-still-confused-overracing-rules/6805063/ (“Russell suggested that there was no penalty for Verstappen because in the end,
it didn’t make any difference to the outcome – a stark contrast to the clash at Silverstone, for example,
when the Mercedes driver was penalised.”). Russell’s contention is that Verstappen was not penalized
because the penalty would not have changed the outcome of the race.
84. See, e.g., BERMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 368 (describing the detailed calculus of when
penalties are applied and that “under an ideal set of rules, an official would call a foul only if the odds
that it was committed are greater than or equal to the ratio of the cost of [a false positive] to the cost of [a
false negative].”).
85. Id.
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the U.S. criminal justice system, which applies the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard because it has judged the theoretical cost of a false positive
(imprisoning an innocent person) much higher than the theoretical cost of a
false negative (letting a guilty person go free).86 Because the cost of a false
positive is much higher than the cost of a false negative, judges and juries
need to be extremely sure that someone is guilty before imprisoning them.
But in a race, the standard of proof applied (i.e., the likelihood that a penalty
applies) inherently varies from driver-to-driver because the cost of false
positives and false negatives is being judged ex post.
Stewards often consider the impact of the penalty on the drivers when
determining whether to penalize the drivers, rather than assessing the facts
and judging whether those facts satisfy a fixed burden of proof.87 For
example, in the 2021 Championship, a wrongly-imposed five-second penalty
(a false positive) on either Verstappen or Hamilton could have been pivotal
and determined the championship; but a wrongly-imposed five-second
penalty on a car in last place may have had no consequences.88 Similarly, the
cost of a false negative may vary: if the leading driver is forty seconds ahead
of the driver in second place, the cost of a false negative is low, since the
driver in second place has no chance of catching up even with a five-second
penalty applied to the race leader. Thus, the assessment of the cost of false
positives and negatives is inherently dependent on the driver’s actual
position in the race, meaning that the standard is contextually variable.
An appeals system that requires Officials to provide a rationale for their
decisions could hold Officials accountable for the penalties they issue.
Teams can appeal penalties, arguing that the application of the original
penalty was not consistent with the ex ante standard of proof, regardless of
what the in-race assessment of costs is. The ex ante system is fairer, and less
dependent on Officials’ cost assessments in fast-changing circumstances,
which may make those assessments inherently inaccurate. Ultimately, an
appeals system can prevent competitors from being treated differently based
on their position in the race, thus protecting drivers from an inherently
uneven and unfair playing field.89

86. Id. at 369 (“[A]n inaccurate conviction—a false positive on the proposition that the defendant is
guilty—is far worse than an inaccurate acquittal. . . . [A] finding of guilt is justified only if the odds of
guilt are extremely high, a principle that is usually expressed in the United States by saying that the jury
should not find the defendant guilty unless it is persuaded of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
87. See Cooper, supra note 83.
88. Colloquially, cars perennially at the back of the grid are commonly known as “backmarkers.”
89. Note that this might also mitigate superstar treatment and alleviate questions of fairness. See,
e.g., Luke Smith, Verstappen: It’s Unfair I’m Treated Differently to Other F1 Drivers, MOTORSPORT
(Dec. 9, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://us.motorsport.com/f1/news/verstappen-saudi-penalties-show-imtreated-differently-to-other-drivers/6866895/ (statement of F1 Driver Max Verstappen regarding the
application of penalties) (“[F]ighting at the front, people are a bit more critical.”).
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Even so, there are some advantages to unappealable penalties. First,
creating an in-race appeals process is difficult to implement because, unlike
in on-field sports like the NBA, MLB, and National Football League (NFL),
a race does not pause, even if an appeal is requested. The longer the race
continues before a final judgment is issued, the more complex the chain of
causation.90 For example, if Verstappen illegally overtakes Hamilton on lap
ten, and builds a lead of fifteen seconds by the time a five-second penalty is
imposed on him post-appeal, Verstappen still leads, because he already
(illegally) overtook Hamilton. Yet if the five-second penalty were applied on
lap ten, Verstappen would have been overtaken by Hamilton, and Hamilton
could have built a comfortable lead. As such, any successfully implemented
appeals process will require finesse and nuance.
Despite these disadvantages, the lack of transparency, the potential for
Officials to apply different standards when it comes to different drivers, and
the potential implications of incorrect decisions are strong reasons to
consider creating penalty appealability. The pitfalls can easily be remedied
with a fine-tuned solution, expanded upon in Part 0.

IV. DRIVING CHANGE BY TAKING CUES FROM THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM
The stewards of F1 are considered an “independent judiciary.”91 Yet the
discussion in Part 0 reveals that stewarding is missing critical elements of an
independent judiciary. The Race Director’s overwhelming discretion lacks
any guardrails or guidelines judges have; inconsistent stewarding is
antithetical to a fair and uniform application of the rules; and a lack of
appeals is unlike most judicial systems and prevents rectifying errors in
officiating. While, as noted, F1 and the justice system are as similar as New
York and Chicago-style “pizza,”92 both systems ostensibly aim to achieve
fair, consistent, and somewhat transparent results. Accordingly, F1’s
stewarding system should take cues from elements of the U.S. judicial
system to: (1) create boundaries for Race Director discretion, (2) develop
more thorough guidelines for implementing penalties and tracking penalty
precedent to ensure consistency, and (3) permit in-race penalty appeals by
using an instant replay-like system.

90. This is akin to the underlying rationale for baseball’s jeopardy rule, which permits umpires to
“eliminate the results and consequences of the earlier call that they are reversing.” BERMAN & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 38, at 422-23. However, in F1 the race is not paused during the deliberation of the call, making
it impossible to eliminate such results.
91. Adam Cooper, Masi Dismisses Alonso Criticism on F1 Stewarding Bias, MOTORSPORT (Oct. 15,
2021),
https://us.motorsport.com/f1/news/masi-dismisses-alonso-criticism-on-f1-stewardbias/6686799/.
92. This is because Chicago-style pizza is not “real” pizza. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Tower
Record (Comedy Central television broadcast Nov. 13, 2013).
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A. CURBING RACE DIRECTOR DISCRETION
As noted, Race Directors have pockets of unbounded (strong) discretion
in making critical decisions that affect the outcome of a race or affect the
safety of at-risk drivers.93 These decisions have to do both with regulations
around the safety car and the safety of the drivers,94 and determining whether
drivers have to return a place to a competitor or face a penalty.95 Decisions
around the safety car and safety of the drivers give the Race Director powers
similar to those of the NBA’s League Office, which, among other things,
determines whether a game should proceed as scheduled or be cancelled due
to “the condition of the playing court or arena, or a general or forecasted
condition involving weather, travel, civil unrest, natural disaster, or other
event.”96 Similarly, the Race Director has the power to determine whether a
race is delayed,97 respond to changing weather conditions,98 and address
incidents affecting safety.99 But the Race Director also possesses broad
discretionary power akin to the power that allows NBA officials to “make
decisions on any point not specifically covered in the rules,”100 since the
Race Director is allowed to prolong or shorten the duration of the safety
lap,101 close the pit lane,102 and determine the use of the DRS system,103 all
without having to consider enumerated factors in making such decisions.
Taken together, the individual Race Director has immense discretionary
power, which in other leagues like the NBA is spread across different offices
and many people.
In addition, the ability to determine whether drivers face a penalty gives
the Race Director powers like those of an NBA referee or official, who rule
on whether to give fouls and penalize players.104 For example, the Race
Director has “[a]bsolute discretion” to ask that a driver give back the “whole
of any advantage he gained by leaving the track,”105 and has similar
discretion to “report any on-track incident or suspected breach . . . to the
stewards.”106 But while the NBA divides these powers into a League Office

93. See supra Part II.A.
94. Decisions concerning the safety of a driver can affect the outcome of a race through the use of a
safety car. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 15.3(e), at 12, art. 21.5, at 16, art. 22.12,
at 20, art. 22.15, at 21.
95. Id. art. 27.3, at 29, art. 47.1, at 47.
96. 2019-20 NBA RULEBOOK, supra note 41, Comments on the Rules, § II(D), at 64.
97. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 40.1, at 44-45.
98. Id. art. 21.5, at 16-17.
99. Id. art. 22.12, at 20.
100. 2019-20 NBA RULEBOOK, supra note 41, r. 2(III), at 11.
101. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 51.10, at 54.
102. Id. art. 28.14, at 31.
103. Id. art. 21.5, at 16-17.
104. 2019-20 NBA RULEBOOK, supra note 41, r. 2, at 10-14.
105. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 27.3, at 29.
106. Id. art. 47.1, at 47.
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and multiple officials, in F1 the Race Director has the great power and great
responsibility of both the League Office and officials bundled into one. This
leads to issues of integrity where the Race Director abuses their discretion,
interference with the contest where the discretion is wrongly applied, and
problems for appeals since there is only one level of decision maker.
There are three ways to mitigate these harms. First, the FIA should curb
discretion by amending the rules to set boundaries and create concrete
definitions on what the Race Director’s discretion permits. While Race
Directors need some flexibility to meet the pressing demands of safety and
in-race decisions that adhere to F1’s strict timetable, amending the rules to
put boundaries might help limit erroneous decisions. For example, the
discretion for the Race Director to disable DRS “[i]n conditions of poor
visibility” may be expounded upon by defining “poor visibility” and what it
means for conditions to improve such that DRS may be re-enabled.107 This
will move the Race Director’s discretion from strong to weak, setting a target
standard to which they can affix their judgment. This change in discretion is
also necessary because the Race Director is a single individual tasked with
immense responsibilities—far more than those assigned to teams of officials
in the NBA. This heavy responsibility on one person is likely to create more
errors, simply because of the limited amount of manpower and collective
deliberative capacity available to make these difficult decisions.
Second, the FIA must create an official post-race review process that
teams, or the FIA itself, can initiate when a controversial, problematic, or
erroneous decision has been made.108 The effect of this is similar to an
Administrative Procedure Act review in American administrative law, which
investigates the decision-making process, the variables that went into it, and
then provides recommendations for how to prevent such problematic
decisions in the future.109 This method of review should be a
multistakeholder process that involves team principals, stewards, F1
management, and drivers, and should produce a publicly available report
assessing the mistakes and ways to mitigate future harm. For example, the
2021 Belgian Grand Prix was entirely rained-out on race day and saw no
competitive racing.110 Because of the conditions, the Race Director permitted

107. Id. art. 21.5(a), at 16.
108. The FIA recently decided to review the events of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix, in a one-off
review similar to the approach being proposed here. @fia, TWITTER (Jan. 13, 2022, 8:05 AM),
https://twitter.com/fia/status/1481658567421747205. This Article proposes a standardized review
process and the creation of procedural boundaries that can be invoked by the FIA.
109. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Christopher S. Yoo, The Bounds of Executive Discretion in the
Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1591, 1596 (2016) (describing this APA function in the context of
executive power).
110. Luke Smith, Ten Things We Learned from the F1 Belgian Grand Prix, MOTORSPORT (Aug. 30,
2021, 9:48 AM), https://us.motorsport.com/f1/news/10-things-we-learned-from-the-belgian-grandprix/6657331/.
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a two-lap procession behind the safety car, after which the race eventually
was ended. But because at least two laps had been completed, that allowed
the “race” to be counted for half-points—even though there had been no
competitive racing.111 Drivers considered this a “farce,” and fans were not
compensated for watching two laps of “racing.”112 A review process will
help create proactive solutions in future instances where such a problem
arises, and bolster trust with fans.
Third, it may be that a Race Director’s misconduct is so severe or so
problematic that teams, drivers, fans, or other stakeholders lose trust in that
Race Director, much in the same way that a judge’s severe misconduct might
undermine the public’s faith in their ability to remain a neutral adjudicator.113
This may have been the case after the fallout from the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand
Prix.114 The FIA must institute an official mechanism that—with sufficient
procedural safeguards—allows for aggrieved teams to call for the resignation
or removal of the Race Director. The process could essentially be modelled
after Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,115 which requires an
independent investigator—in that case, the Attorney General—to investigate
offenses, if, for example, more than two thirds of teams and drivers move to
investigate the Director. If there is an abuse of discretion, then the
independent investigator—in F1’s case, an outside counsel or an individual
from the International Court of Appeals (ICA)—can recommend an
expanded investigation or the resignation of the Race Director to F1
management. If the Race Director is forced to resign, the procedure should
then prohibit the FIA from hiring that Race Director in the future.
These solutions are meant to ensure accountability and transparency in
areas where Race Directors make mistakes. As of now, neither the F1
Sporting Regulations nor the FIA Code provide a mechanism for removal at
the behest of aggrieved competitors. And hopefully, such removal will not
be frequently used. But having a procedure provides safeguards that may
prevent future controversies from taking place, tarnishing the sport, and
ultimately being decisive factors in championships.

111. Nate Saunders, F1 Drivers Relieved, Confused and Angry in Equal Measure After Belgian Grand
Prix Washout, ESPN (Aug. 29, 2021), https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/32110046/f1-driversrelieved-confused-angry-equal-measure-belgian-grand-prix-washout.
112. Id.
113. See,
e.g.,
Impeachments
of
Federal
Judges,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federal-judges (last visited Jan. 16, 2022).
114. Prior to the start of the 2022 season, the FIA president removed 2021 Race Director Michael
Masi as Race Director for the 2022 season, though it is unclear what the process behind his removal was.
Nate Saunders, Michael Masi Removed as F1 Race Director After Abu Dhabi Investigation, ESPN (Feb.
17, 2022), https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/33310763/michael-masi-removed-f1-race-director-abudhabi-investigation.
115. See generally Ethics in Government Act, § 601, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-75 (1978) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591 et seq.).
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B. CREATING GUIDELINES FOR PENALTIES AND TRACKING PRECEDENT
As noted, a significant issue with stewarding is lack of consistency. For
example, the rule requiring that an overtaking car leave at least one car’s
width116 was inconsistently applied during the 2021 season.117 But, as noted,
neither the F1 Regulations nor the FIA Code note what penalties apply to
various infractions.118 The lack of standardization creates disparities in
penalties, akin to disparities in sentencing prior to the passage of U.S.
sentencing guidelines.119 While there is much criticism of over-penalization
through the sentencing guidelines,120 the U.S. sentencing guidelines at least
provide a baseline for consistency, even if that baseline is poorly calibrated.
At minimum, penalty guidelines in F1 will provide signposts to Officials that
will ensure consistency, which in turn improves fairness. By formulating
such penalty guidelines, F1 can move from the standards set in the F1
Sporting Regulations and FIA Code, towards a “standardified rule” that is
generally a standard, but that adheres to benchmarks which narrows the
discretion available to the official.121 This might move F1’s penalty system
towards that of the NBA, where fouls have standardized consequences—like
free throws for personal fouls and technical fouls, possession from out-ofbounds for some personal fouls, or change of possession for some offensive
fouls.122
In addition to standardization of penalties, the FIA must also track what
penalties are applied for what actions by creating a database of penalties. For
example, if a driver pushes another driver off Copse corner in Silverstone,123

116. The F1 Sporting Regulations require drivers to follow the FIA International Sporting Code. 2021
F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 2.1, at 2. Appendix L of the International Sporting Code
lays out the one car width rule. See CODE APPENDIX L, supra note 80, art. 2(a), at 47.
117. See, e.g., Scott Mitchell-Malm, F1 Drivers Don’t Know What’s Worth a Penalty Anymore, THE
RACE (July 6, 2021), https://the-race.com/formula-1/f1-drivers-dont-know-whats-worth-a-penaltyanymore/.
118. See supra note 68 and accompanying discussion.
119. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much
Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 697 (2010).
120. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—and What Can Be
Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1431-33 (2017) (criticizing sentences and guidelines for being
over punitive).
121. A “rulified standard” is a rule that can sometimes be pierced, when “enforcing the rule as a rule
would produce unusually high costs; and . . . disregarding the rule’s form on this occasion would incur
low costs on the dimensions . . . that justified its rulification in the first place.” Mitchell N. Berman, “Let
‘em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 GEO. L.J. 1325, 1362-63 (2011). Here, proposing
to provide benchmarks for a standard is the inverse: a “standardified rule” rather than a “rulified
standard,” where the standard should be enforced according to those benchmarks, preventing the
production of unusually high costs and ensuring that the standard incurs low costs.
122. This is not an exhaustive list. See generally 2019-20 NBA RULEBOOK, supra note 41, r. 12, at
38-48.
123. Silverstone is a motor racing circuit in the United Kingdom. See generally SILVERSTONE,
https://www.silverstone.co.uk/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2022).
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causing a collision, that driver receives a ten-second time penalty.124 While
overtakes on Copse corner are supposedly infrequent,125 Officials will have
a frame of reference for the next time such an incident takes place, in a
database that is easily accessible during the fast-paced nature of a race. Of
course, racing incidents are often infrequent, and no two incidents are the
exact same, and some amount of judgment and discretion is required when
assessing driver intent and responsibility. But a focus on precedent will allow
Officials to weigh less heavily the subjective interpretation of driver intent,
which is hard to assess in a fast-paced, changing environment—and instead
make penalty application a pluralistic form of application of the rules that
looks at the text, conventions, values and norms, and precedent.
Precedentialism might help drive fairness and consistency, add to the
integrity of the sport, and simply make it easier to determine when a penalty
and what penalty should be applied. Focus on precedent could also facilitate
the in-race appeals process, as well as any permissible post-race appeals
process. Relying on precedent also reduces pressure on stewards, given that
similar penalties are effectively issue precluded.126 And consistency might
mitigate differential treatment between backmarkers,127 midfielders, and
championship contenders.
C. EXPANDING INSTANT REPLAY AND APPEALABILITY
As noted, most penalties enforced by Officials are not subject to
appeal.128 But incorrectly called penalties or incorrectly non-called penalties
can both cause harm. In the MLB, NBA, and NFL, teams have the
opportunity to call for instant replays. And in the U.S. judicial system, parties
can call for immediate appeal prior to final judgment where a lower court’s
ruling may have immediate consequences, such as the enforcement of an
injunction,129 or where a party’s constitutional rights are at stake.130 This is
124. See, e.g., Jonathan Noble & Filip Cleeren, How Has F1 Penalised Pushing Off Track? Penalties,
Warnings and More, AUTOSPORT (Nov. 19, 2021, 7:40 AM), https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/howhas-f1-penalised-pushing-off-track/6799014/.
125. ‘It Was a Desperate Move’ – Furious Horner Hits Out at Hamilton After Verstappen Crash, F1
(July 18, 2021), https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.it-was-a-desperate-move-furious-hornerhits-out-at-hamilton-after-verstappen.70vvrMmYUhNPfjSVc4xDbi.html (noting that Red Bull team
principal Christian Horner said, “Lewis has stuck a wheel up the inside of one of the fastest corners on
this world championship. He’s driven this circuit for years; you know you don’t do that here.”).
126. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 219, 219 (1979)
(noting the growth of collateral estoppel in response to docket pressure).
127. See supra text accompanying note 88.
128. 2021 F1 SPORTING REGULATIONS, supra note 13, art. 17.3, at 13, art. 47.3, at 48.
129. See 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1) (noting appeals courts have jurisdiction for interlocutory orders); see
also Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981) (applying this principle).
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as applied by Cohen v. Benefit Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949) (applying § 1291 in cases where the case “finally determine[s] claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”).
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because injunctions can have immediate damages, as can decisions on an
individual’s constitutional rights. Similarly, as noted, incorrectly decided inrace penalties can have an immediate impact on the outcome of a race that
cannot be undone later in the race or in a post-race situation. The underlying
issue is one of desert: the essence of the sport is to determine which driver
and team finish the race first, testing the engineering and ingenuity of the car
and the physical capability and racecraft of the driver. Where an official
makes an incorrect call, they upset the test, injecting an external element that
affects the contest and undermines the test of the drivers’ and teams’ skills.
Thus, the winner may not be the best driver in the best car—it may be the
driver that benefited the most from errors in stewarding.
The FIA should implement an immediate, but limited, in-race appeals
process.131 To limit the impact on the stewards’ in-race workload, appeals
should be permissible only in cases where a team believes a penalty was
wrongly called (i.e., a false positive). Permitting teams to appeal false
negatives—wrong non-calls—may open the floodgates too wide,
overwhelming stewards who need to respond to a variety of other changing
on-track circumstances. Teams must appeal the penalty within one lap of the
announcement of the penalty and may only do so if they have additional
telemetry or data that could change the determination of fact. This is similar
to professional tennis’s use of Hawk-Eye to use statistical algorithms, based
on real-time data, to determine whether a ball was out.132 In fact, the FIA has
established an offsite “Virtual Race Control Room” that helps process and
analyze video and data to “replay and review aspects of the competition and
the decisions made” during all races in the 2022 season.133 This Virtual Race
Control Room could help process the additional telemetry or data and help
determine the outcome of the appeal, without adding to the workload of the
onsite Officials.
Further, by limiting appeals to instances where new telemetry or data
can change the determination of fact, the FIA prevents teams from making
broad-based arguments. Officials will thus not be inundated with needless
appeals and can make a decision based on the facts. The justice system has
similar limitations, permitting retrials when evidence previously unavailable
comes to light.134 And to further limit abuse, each driver should only be
131. This is in addition to post-race reviews, which also permit reviews if “a significant and relevant
new element is discovered which was unavailable to the parties seeking the review at the time of the
decision concerned.” 2021 FIA CODE, supra note 68, art 14.1.1, at 63. This process is also different from
the proposed Video Assistant Referee system, which is designed to provide more resources and replay
ability to officials. Alex Kalinauckas, FIA Explains How VAR System Will Work in F1, MOTORSPORT
(Mar. 19, 2022, 7:09 AM), https://us.motorsport.com/f1/news/fia-explains-how-var-system-will-workin-f1/9136112/.
132. See, e.g., BERMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 376-77.
133. Kalinauckas, supra note 131.
134. FED R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1).
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permitted two appeals per race.135 Finally, if Officials—by majority vote of
the stewards—are to reverse their decision, they should apply the More
Likely Than Not (“MLTN”) standard, unlike the Clear and Obvious Visual
Evidence (“COVE”) standard applied in the NFL.136 This is because a
MLTN standard minimizes the total number of errors,137 which is the
preferable outcome here since it is unclear whether the cost of false positives
and false negatives differs greatly, and that assessment is circumstancedependent.138
This system of in-race appeal has several benefits, in addition to
mitigating the problems outlined in Part 0.0. It goes hand-in-hand with
preventing post-race appeals for most in-race penalties without new
evidence, since post-race appeals for in-race penalties may engage in
difficult causation and counterfactual analysis that may provide no fruitful
outcome. For example, assume Officials incorrectly applied a ten-second
penalty to Verstappen on lap ten, causing him to move from first to second.
If the third-place contender then crashed into Verstappen causing
Verstappen’s retirement from the race, a counterfactual analysis may suggest
that without the incorrectly applied penalty, Verstappen would have
maintained the lead, and won the race—where in reality he did not finish.
Because the intervening causes create an innumerable number of potential
outcomes, this counterfactual analysis provides no help, and need not be
engaged in.139 But an in-race appeal process at least provides drivers and
teams with some recourse, thus increasing stewarding accuracy and allowing
them to account for facts that may not have been available at the time of
decision but are nonetheless relevant.

V. CONCLUSION
F1 is arguably the pinnacle of motorsport. It combines the limits of
human physicality with engineering that is dreamed up in science fiction.
135. Of course, a variety of appeals processes exist. The NFL penalizes appeals that do not overturn
the original decision by docking a timeout. BERMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 435-38. The MLB
and professional tennis limit players to three incorrect challenges. Id. But because teams in F1 do not
have timeouts or other pause-game options, it seems unnecessary to penalize the drivers or teams for
appealing.
136. Michael N. Berman, Replay, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1683, 1691-97 (2011); see also BERMAN &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 438.
137. Replay, supra note 136.
138. See supra Part II.A. Note that assessing the optimal standard and the potential impacts of an
MLTN standard are beyond the scope of this Article. But there may be negative effects to a MLTN
standard, such as striking stakeholders as arbitrary and possibly biased, which would reduce fan and
competitor confidence in the sport.
139. An additional problem is that even if this counterfactual analysis could be successful, an effective
remedy would be impossible. Unlike do-overs in NBA games, given that there are more than two teams
at play and an immense number of variables, in addition to no “score” at any point in the race, a do-over
that replicates conditions at the time of the incorrect call would effectively be impossible. See BERMAN
& FRIEDMAN, supra note 38 at 458.
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However, that pinnacle has been overshadowed by politicking, poor
stewarding, and questions of fairness and justice that cast a pall on the
essential contest and test. The procedural mechanisms suggested in this
Article are just a start that will take F1 from flying by the seat of its race suit,
to a more formalized system that prevents issues of fairness and justice from
overtaking racing as the key factor in championships. This Article addresses
only a few elements of fairness in F1. There remain many unjust practices in
F1, including ineffective cost caps,140 a lack of women, diverse, and
generally underrepresented or underprivileged team members on the grid,141
the hosting of races in countries with known human rights violations,142 and
the integrity of the broader appeals process from F1 and the FIA to the ICA
and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. However, F1 changes incrementally,
but moves forward every year. These solutions might help move it forward,
too, though that progress will not be measured in tenths of seconds, but in
how fair the sport becomes.

140. See, e.g., Christian Sylt, The $1.8 Billion Exemptions from F1’s Budget Cap, FORBES (Nov. 1,
2019, 6:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/csylt/2019/11/01/the-18-billion-exemptions-from-f1sbudget-cap/?sh=50749aa14bb7 (discussing the major loopholes in the new F1 cost caps).
141. See, e.g., When Will We See the Next Female F1 Driver, MOTORSPORT WK. (Oct. 20, 2021),
https://www.motorsportweek.com/2021/10/20/when-will-we-see-the-next-female-f1-driver/ (discussing
the history of female F1 drivers and the lack of a current woman on the grid); Mark Hughes, Billionaires’
Sons Only? Mark Hughes on Money and Talent in F1, THE RACE (Dec. 3, 2020), https://therace.com/formula-1/billionaires-sons-only-mark-hughes-on-money-and-talent-in-f1/
(noting
the
overrepresentation of F1 drivers from wealthier backgrounds).
142. Saudi Arabia: F1 Events Risk Whitewashing Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 2, 2021, 12:00
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/02/saudi-arabia-f1-events-risk-whitewashing-abuses.
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